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Rosca Auctions in a South Indian Village
Stefan Klonner

Abstract:

A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetricindependent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a
structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder’s
utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, nonaltruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by
experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more
than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring
relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an
unforeseen expenditure and this information is public, bidders act more altruistically than when
information is private and the Rosca funds are used for investment, indicating reciprocal risk
sharing among Rosca participants.

JEL Classification: D44; G20
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Introduction
The rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is a financial institution which is observed
around the world, mainly in developing countries. Roscas serve as a substitute for saving in and
borrowing from more well-known financial institutions such as banks and credit co-operatives
and flourish in economic settings where formal financial institutions seem to fail to meet the
needs of a large fraction of the population. In general terms, a Rosca can be defined as ‘a
voluntary grouping of individuals who agree to contribute financially at each of a set of
uniformly-spaced dates towards the creation of a fund, which will then be allotted in accordance
with some prearranged principle to each member of the group in turn’ (Calomiris and Rajaraman,
1998). Once a member has received a fund, also called a pot, she is excluded from the allotment
of future pots until the Rosca ends. In a so-called random Rosca, a lot determines each date’s
‘winner’ of the pot. In a bidding Rosca, an auction is staged among the members who have not
yet received a pot. The highest bid wins the pot and the price the winner pays is distributed
among the other bidders. In a third, empirically relevant, allocation mechanism, the decision on
each period’s allocation of the pot is left to the Rosca organizer.1
In the South-Indian state of Tamil Nadu with a population of 62 million, the turnover in
registered Roscas alone equaled 100 billion Rupees, about 2.5 billion US dollars, in 2000
(Ganga-Rao, 2001), which compares to aggregate bank deposits of 66 billion Rupees (Reserve
Bank of India, 2000). Given such importance of Roscas, economists’ interest in this institution
has been astoundingly small. In the theoretical papers by Besley et al. (1993, 1994), participants
join a Rosca to finance a durable good whose costs require saving for more than one period. In
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In Handa and Kirton’s (1999) sample, 53 percent of the Roscas operate in this way.
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Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), each participant can engage in an investment project whose
revenue is privately observed. In all these papers, the auctions serve as a mechanism to allocate
pots earlier to participants who have a higher willingness to pay for the durable or investment
project, respectively, and can therefore be advantageous if participants are not identical. The
approaches to bidding Roscas taken by these authors are deterministic in the sense that all payoffs
occurring during the course of the Rosca can be calculated before the beginning of the first
auction. In a stochastic Rosca model, in contrast, participants receive new signals before each
auction. In this connection, Klonner (forthcoming; 2001) considers risk averse individuals whose
income streams are subject to idiosyncratic, privately observed shocks and shows how a bidding
Rosca serves as a risk sharing device.
Empirical studies of Roscas were started by anthropologists (Geertz, 1962) and are much
more numerous than the few theoretical papers cited above. All recent econometric studies of
Roscas are exclusively concerned with the determinants of Rosca participation (Aliber, 2000;
Anderson and Balland, 1999; Gugerty, 2000; Handa and Kirton, 1999; Levenson and Besley,
1996). None of this econometric research, however, analyzes Rosca auctions, instead treating the
Rosca’s allotment mechanism as a black box.
Based on a case study, the goal of this paper is to improve the understanding of how
bidding Roscas function in reality by shading light on the auction allotment mechanism, and,
more generally, to provide a deeper understanding of the environment in which financial
transactions within a village economy take place. With a dataset of 149 Rosca auctions from an
agricultural South-Indian village, we show how auction outcomes respond to the distribution of
information among the bidders. When, as is the case in the study village, funds from a Rosca are
used to overcome indivisibilities in investment and outside credit is sufficiently costly, bidding
leads to social costs arising out of strategic behavior. In this case, the efficiency of a Rosca does
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not only depend on the order of receipt of the pots but also on the prices obtaining in the auctions.
Allowing for altruistic behavior of the bidders, our results suggest that the limited size of a Rosca
group can increase the efficiency through repeated interaction among its members and effective
leadership on the side of the organizer. Given the high volatility of Rosca-auction outcomes on
the other hand, our findings document the trade-off between the advantages of small-scale
financial intermediation and the volatility implied by such arrangements when individuals are
confronted with a stochastic environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe the study village
(henceforth referred to as ‘E’), present the dataset on Roscas auctions, and summarize the salient
features of these data together with some qualitative evidence. In Section 2.1, we develop a
stochastic Rosca model, which builds on Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen’s (1999) idea that participants
have investment projects whose returns are independently and identically distributed and
privately observed. In Section 2.3, we discuss some implications of the equilibrium of this model.
Section 2.4 augments the benchmark model of Section 2.2 with altruism, whereby bidders care
not only about their own, but also about the payoffs to all other bidders, and it is shown how such
behavior improves the efficiency of a Rosca. In Section 3, a structural econometric model, which
is derived from the augmented model, is estimated by the method of maximum likelihood.
Section 4 summarizes the results and offers conclusions.

1 THE DATA AND SOME QUALITATIVE FINDINGS
1.1 The Study Village
The village E is located in a fertile river basin in the southern part of Tamil Nadu. River irrigation
facilitates two paddy harvests per year, one in autumn and one in winter, whereby, according to
farmers, the October-harvest is about 50% more profitable than the one in February on average.
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Recently, some farmers have started banana cultivation. The village population numbers about
1000, comprising about 230 households, of which 48 belong to scheduled castes and live in a socalled colony about 500 meters away from the main village, where the caste Hindus live. The
village has a post office but no bank branch. Although male literacy is as high as 57% and bus
connections to two towns with several banking facilities are frequent, comparatively inexpensive
and much used, financial transactions with banks play a small role for the three-fifths of village
households whose primary income source is agriculture. The only regularly mentioned formal
financial transaction within this group is a loan for agricultural inputs from an agricultural cooperative (see van Dillen, forthcoming).

1.2 The Data
Since the aim of this study is to investigate Rosca auctions, information from organizers is
indispensable because, in E, Rosca participants could, at the very most, recall those auctions
which they had won. Many participants, especially those in the colony, were not even aware of
many of the modalities of the Roscas in which they participated, such as the number of
participants or the amount in the pot.
Since none of the Roscas which I could observe in E is registered with the government, as
Tamil state law requires, organizers were generally unwilling to admit that they administer a
Rosca. I succeeded in interviewing 11 of the 19 bidding Rosca organizers whom I could find in
E. I included all their Roscas which were currently going on or had ended not earlier than after
the autumn harvest of 1999 and for which written records were available. This yielded
information on 23 Roscas and 149 auctions. For each auction in the sample, I recorded the
winning bid, the winner’s use of the pot, and whether this purpose was his private information
during the auction. Moreover, for each Rosca in the sample, I reported the contribution of each
member in each round, the number of participants in the Rosca, the number of Roscas the
4

organizer had completed before starting the one from which the observation stems, and the
number of Roscas he had completed with the same group from which the observation stems.
Some summary statistics are provided in Table 1. Note that each observation in this dataset refers
to the outcome of one auction. Thus, for example, if at the time of the interview, in a Rosca with
10 participants, 6 auctions had taken place, this Rosca contributes 6 observations to the dataset.
Of course, the Rosca-specific variables take the same respective values in all of these six
observations.

1.3 Stylized Facts about Harvest-Bidding Roscas in E
We now combine the evidence from the data with some qualitative observations to summarize
some key features of harvest-bidding Roscas which are important to set up a theoretical model
that will serve as a benchmark for explaining Rosca auction outcomes in E:
1. Rosca funds are almost never used for consumption or domestic purposes (2 of 128
auctions where the organizer recalled what an auction’s winner used the pot for). Instead
Rosca funds are mostly used for productive investment (80 of 128 cases), e.g. buying a
field plot or starting banana cultivation, or what villagers call “emergencies” (31 cases),
which are marriages or the ritual puberty function of a daughter or a close relative. Less
frequent uses are buying jewelry, settling debt, medical treatment and children’s
education, which may also be regarded as investments since they increase or consolidate a
2

household’s net wealth and human capital, respectively.

2. When there is no ‘emergency’, information on a winner’s purpose is mostly private before
the beginning of an auction (102 out of 118 cases). This means that if someone intends to
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Organizers were sure that, when the purpose is unknown, it is not an ‘emergency’. Moreover, in
those 21 cases, the winner always kept his purpose secret, with one exception where,
5

obtain a pot to buy a field plot, for example, he does not tell other bidders about his
intention before the auction. Organizers and participants say that it is advantageous to
keep a potential investment use of Rosca funds secret.
3. When information on the purpose of an auction’s winner is public, it is mostly an
‘emergency’ (24 out of 40 cases). Marriage arrangements are usually known throughout
the village well in advance so that, in these cases, it is not a bidder’s decision whether to
reveal this information public or not. Organizers and participants say that bidding is less
competitive in such cases. It is claimed, instead, that other bidders understand the need in
question and that bidding does not go as high.
4. Lying about the use of Rosca funds (e.g. pretending a marriage when there is none) is
virtually impossible because, ex post, the use of the funds is obvious to anybody in the
village and dishonest people are excluded from future Roscas. Such an exclusion was
considered a prohibitively severe sanction by all participants interviewed.
5. Defaulting on contributions also results in exclusion from future Roscas. Out of the 11
3

organizers who responded, only one mentioned problems with outstanding contributions.
If somebody pays a contribution late, the organizer has to step in.

6. Participants say that it is crucial to be able to obtain a pot when there is an unforeseen
opportunity or ‘emergency’, and that, for this reason, random Roscas are useless.
7. In a different sample of 21 participants in harvest bidding Roscas in the village E, in 10
out of 14 cases where the respondents had already obtained a pot of an ongoing Rosca, the
winner used the pot for a different purpose than he had been planning when he had joined

according to the organizer, the winner said before the auction that he needed money without
further specifying why.
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the Rosca, or he did not have a particular idea what to use the funds for when he had
joined the Rosca. In three other cases where the participants knew in advance what to use
the funds for (purchase of a field plot or marriage of a daughter), the timing (in which
round to take the pot) was not determined at the beginning. The only case in which a
winner knew when he wanted to take the pot and what to use it for, was someone who
took the first pot to repair his house.
8. In the sample obtained from Rosca organizers, the observed winning bid fluctuates in 15
of 16 Roscas where at least five auctions were recorded, i.e. there exists a t, such that, in
the t-th round, a higher winning bid is observed than in the (t – 1)-th round, even when the
funds are used for the same purpose.
9. Both organizers of and participants in bidding Roscas pointed out that unrestrained
bidding is bad for the welfare of the group. It is considered advantageous if, in each
round, a Rosca allocates as much money as possible to the winner and does not favour
losing bidders through a high winning bid, which is equally distributed among the losers
of an auction.
Since investment use of Rosca funds is the most frequent case in E (see observation 1 of the list
above), a model where each bidder’s desire to finance an investment project determines his bid
seems appropriate as a benchmark. From 2 and 4 we conclude that, in such a model, the kind of
investment project to which a bidder has access is his private information. Observations 6, 7 and
8 can be interpreted as clear evidence against a deterministic Rosca model because, to apply such
a model, participants would have to know the purpose for which to use the funds from the Rosca
in advance, which contradicts 7. Moreover, in the deterministic model of Kovsted and Lyk-
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He was, however, the only organizer in the sample who was incapable of keeping proper
records of his Roscas and made a somewhat confused impression during the interviews.
7

Jensen (1999), the winning bid decreases monotonically from auction to auction during the
course of the Rosca, which contradicts 8. Observation 5 implies that we can neglect any problems
of defaulting on contributions. Observation 9 implies that the marginal disutility to an auction’s
winner from receiving less money due to bidding in the auction is higher than the sum of the
marginal utilities to that same auction’s losers from receiving more money through the
distribution of the winning bid.

2 THEORY
2.1 A Model of Rosca Auctions in E
In this section, we use the observations from the previous section to formalize the course of a
harvest-bidding Rosca in E. Note that, throughout this paper, we take each Rosca participation as
given and set the problem of an optimal Rosca portfolio aside. Problems of defaulting on Rosca
contributions are also set aside, an assumption, which is supported by observation 5 cited in the
previous section.
For simplicity, consider a bidding Rosca with 2 participants. At the beginning of each
meeting, each participant contributes m Rupees. Consequently, the pot amounts to 2m. In the first
round, an oral ascending bid auction takes place. In such an auction, the bid b is increased
continuously. The winner receives the pot minus his last bid, bw say, in total 2m – bw, and the
loser, in turn, bw. In the second round, that participant who did not win the auction in the first
round receives the pot without a discount.
To formalize the ideas developed in the previous section, suppose that each individual is
risk neutral and that, in period t, his preferences can be described by the intertemporally separable
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
U t = qt + δ qt +1 ,
8

where qτ denotes consumption measured in Rupees in period τ and δ ≤ 1 is a discount factor for
future consumption. Each period covers one paddy crop cycle so that there are two periods per
agricultural year. Suppose that, after every harvest, each Rosca participant has access to an
investment project which costs 2m and that each Rosca participant participates in only one
bidding Rosca at a time. In each period, the profit which the investment project yields is
determined by a random variable, R say, which is independently and identically distributed over
the participants with the smooth parametric cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(r;θ, λ),
where θ and λ, the former a vector, are parameters. λ marks the lower bound of the support of R.
The profit from an investment creates an instantaneous utility equivalent to consuming 2mr,
where r is the realization of R. Further assume that each individual privately observes his
realization of R in period 1 before the auction in period 1. We assume that investing 2m is always
preferred to consuming 2m, i.e. λ > 1 and that the winner of an auction has to consume or invest
the funds obtained from the Rosca instantaneously. Outside credit is available to finance the gap
between the funds received from the Rosca, 2m – bw, and the cost of the investment project. Of
course this gap is equal to bw. Every Rupee borrowed creates an instantaneous disutility of c > 1.
To insure that bw has to be financed completely by outside credit, which is essential to keep the
analysis tractable, we will assume that saving outside the Rosca is not possible.
It should also be said that we have not explicitly incorporated inflation into the model,
which may play a role in our application, where Roscas have a lifetime of five to eight years.
Unfortunately, a price index for investment goods of the kind Rosca funds are used for in E is not
available. The consumer price index for agricultural laborers in the state of Tamil Nadu, however,
rose from 725 in December 1989 to 1752 in December of 1999 (base year: 1960/61, source:
Central Statistical Organization), which implies an average annual rate of inflation of 9.2 percent.
For the rest of this paper, we will assume that the nominal price of the investment project as well
9

as the realized and expected rate of inflation remain constant over the lifetime of the Rosca,
which implies that the discount factor δ will capture any effect of inflation that would affect
participants’ actions in the Rosca.
We now turn to the Rosca auction which, in E, is invariably of the oral ascending bid
(OA) form, i.e. those participants who have not yet received a pot meet and submit successive
oral bids until only one bidder, the winner, remains. Since we have to refer to standard auctions at
several stages of the theoretical and econometric analysis, we briefly sketch the setting of what
will be referred to as a ‘standard auction’. There is one seller, who owns a single, indivisible item
and K buyers. Each bidder knows K and his own valuation (or value, in short) for the item, which
is the maximum amount he would be willing to pay for the item, but none of the other bidders’
values. The values are identically and independently distributed (see Matthews, 1990). It is
further assumed that the seller cannot set a minimum price.
We model an OA-Rosca auction as a so-called button auction, where each bidder presses
a button as the standing bid continuously increases. A bidder drops out of the bidding process
once he releases his button. The auction is over once there is only one bidder still pressing his
button. He receives the pot at a price equal to the standing bid at the moment the other bidder
dropped out, bw.
For the derivation of a bidding equilibrium in the Rosca button auction, it is useful to
consider a second-price, sealed bid (SPS)-Rosca auction. In such an auction, the active
participants submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The highest bid wins and the winner pays a
price equal to the second highest bid submitted. Although, at least in the context of Roscas, this
type of auction is empirically irrelevant, we shall argue that, under certain assumptions, its
equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the OA-Rosca auction. We will assume that in the button
auction, at each level of the standing bid, each bidder only observes whether the auction is still
10

going on or not, i.e. he cannot observe how many other bidders are still holding down their
buttons or at which level of the standing bid other bidders have quit the auction. Thus each
bidder’s problem is to decide when to release his button. Suppose that each bidder releases his
button at a standing bid equal to his bid in the SPS-Rosca auction. If all bidders follow this rule,
the payoffs to all participants are equal in the SPS and the OA-Rosca auction. Further, since,
during the button auction, by assumption, a bidder does not obtain any further information than a
bidder of a SPS-Rosca auction has, the reduced normal form games corresponding to the secondprice sealed bid and the oral ascending bid Rosca auction are identical. Thus they are strategically
equivalent, which implies that the equilibrium of the SPS-Rosca auction is also an equilibrium of
the OA-Rosca auction.
Even when there are more than two bidders in a Rosca auction, the assumption that, in the
course of the bidding, a bidder of an OA-Rosca auction does not obtain any further information
than a bidder of a SPS-Rosca auction can be justified by the observation that, in the former
auction, at any level of the standing bid, it is usually not clear how many bidders are still in the
auction and whether any of the bidders has already quit the bidding process because Rosca
auction records show that often a bidder raises the standing bid for the first time after the auction
has already gone on for many thousands of Rupees. The problem that, in contrast to a button
auction, bidding increments in an OA auction are of a discrete nature, should be negligible since
auction records indicate that, before the bidding stops, bidding increments are usually as small as
0.1 to 0.2% of the amount in the pot.

2.2 Non-altruistic Bidding Equilibrium
Before the auction in the first round, each bidder observes the revenue of his investment project,
rk, k = 1, 2. Let us consider bidder 1, say, who is confronted with the other participant bidding
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according to the function b(r2), which is strictly increasing in r2. Suppose bidder 1 also adopts the
bidding function b(⋅), but that he has the option to pretend not to have observed r1 but ρ, say.
If he submits b(ρ) and wins the auction, then, provided he invests the funds obtained from
the Rosca, his expected utility is U w ( ρ | r ) ≡ 2mr − cE[b( R ) | R < ρ ] , where, for notational

convenience, we have written r instead of r1. 2mr is his utility from engaging in the investment
project with profit r. E[b( R ) | R < ρ ] is the expected value of the bid submitted by bidder 2
conditional on the event that bidder 2 bids higher than b(ρ). Of course, if b(⋅) is strictly
increasing, as we have assumed, the events b( R ) ≤ b( ρ ) and R ≤ ρ are identical. Since, in
expectation, bidder 1 has to take a loan of E[b( R ) | R ≤ ρ ] to finance the costs of the investment,
we have to subtract cE[b( R ) | R ≤ ρ ] from the profit of the investment project. If bidder 1 wins
the auction then, in the second round, he cannot receive the pot and thus, in this case, his
expected utility from the second Rosca round is zero. The probability of winning the auction is
P w ( ρ ) ≡ P( R ≤ ρ ) . Note that, strictly speaking, we would also have to subtract m, the
contribution each participant has to pay at the beginning of each meeting, from U w ( ρ | r ) . Since,
however, after joining the Rosca, each participant has to pay m at every meeting irrespective of
the auction outcome, this is not relevant for the strategic analysis.
At this stage, we have assumed that, in a symmetric bidding equilibrium, it is always
advantageous for the winner to invest the funds obtained from the Rosca instead of consuming
them. Note that, in our sample, consumption is never cited as the purpose Rosca funds are used
for. Since it is also essential for solving the model that winners never consume these funds, we
will now formally rule out the possibility that, after an auction, a winner prefers to consume.
Towards this end, we first define the vector of parameters β ≡ (θ, λ, c, δ, m). Assuming
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symmetric bidding, in this notation, a preference for investing the funds over consuming them for
all possible realizations of R, requires that
(1)

2mr – cb(r) > 2m – b(r) for all r > λ.

Rearranging ( 1 ), we can now define
B(b(⋅)) ≡ {β: b(r) < 2m(r-1)/(c-1) for all r > λ}.
In words, given b(⋅), B is the subset of parameters which ensure that ( 1 ) holds.
If bidder 1 submits b(ρ) and this turns out to be the second highest bid submitted, his
expected utility is U l ( ρ ) ≡ b( ρ ) + EU l . In this case, his bid is the price the winner pays and this
price is paid to him, bidder 1, as the loser of the auction. EU tl is the expected utility from
receiving the pot in the second round without a discount, 2δ E[R]. The probability of submitting
the second highest bid, if bidder 1 pretends to have observed ρ, is P l ( ρ ) ≡ P( R > ρ ) .
Consequently, the expected utility of bidder 1 before submitting his bid is given by
(2)

U ( ρ | r ) ≡ U w ( ρ | r )P w ( ρ ) + U l ( ρ )Pl ( ρ ) .

To derive the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium of such an auction, we determine how an
infinitesimal change in the pretended return ρ affects expected utility. To this end, we take the
derivative of ( 2 ) w.r.t. ρ to obtain
(3)

dU ( ρ | r )
= (1 − F ( ρ ) ) b′( ρ ) + f ( ρ ) ( 2mr − EU l − (1 + c )b( ρ ) ) .
dρ

For notional convenience, we have dropped the parameters θ and λ, on which F depends. In
equilibrium, nothing can be gained from pretending a different return than the one actually
observed. Formally, we equate the RHS of ( 3 ) with r substituted for ρ to zero. This gives a firstorder differential equation,
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b′( r ) (1 − F ( r ) ) = f ( r ) ( (1 + c )b( r ) + EU l − 2mr ) ,

(4)

whose solution is
1+ c
r


 1 − F (t ) 
l
b ( r ) ≡  2mr − EU + 2m∫ 
dt  /(1 + c ) ,



1 − F (r) 
r


e

(5)

where r marks the upper bound of R’s support. The symmetric bidding equilibrium is
summarized in

Proposition 1
For parameters β ∈ B(be(⋅)), a Rosca with second-price auctions has a symmetric bidding
equilibrium in which each bidder determines his bid according to the function b e (⋅) .

A more detailed discussion of bte (⋅) follows in the next subsection.
In equilibrium, ex ante expected utility from joining a Rosca, EU(be) say, is obtained as
E[U ( R | R )] , where U(⋅|⋅) is given in ( 2 ). This can be written as
EU(be) =

1
1
2mE[ R2:2 ] − cE[b e ( R1:2 )]) + ( E[b e ( R1:2 )] + EU l )
(
2
2

(6)
= ( E[ R2:2 ] + δ E[ R ]) m − ( c − 1) E[b e ( R1:2 )]/ 2 ,

where Ri:n denotes the i’th lowest order statistic in a sample of size n. Ex ante, winning and losing
the auction in the first round is equally likely and the winner’s profitability is distributed as the
higher order statistic of an iid sample of 2 random variables drawn from F. The price obtaining in
the auction, in contrast, is determined by the lower order statistic of that sample. The term
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( c − 1) E[b e ( R1:2 )]/ 2 represents the strategic costs which bidding entails when outside credit is
costly.

2.3 The Notion of Overbidding in Rosca Auctions
It is well known that, in a standard SIPV second-price sealed bid auction, each bidder submits his
maximum willingness to pay for the item auctioned. For obvious reasons, this dominant strategy
is also referred to as ‘truth-telling’. For the bidding equilibrium of an OA-Rosca auction, in
contrast, Klonner (forthcoming) has shown that, when participants are risk averse and use Rosca
funds for consumption, bidders overbid relative to their maximum willingness to pay. We will
now analyze this point in the context of the present model. To this end, we first need to determine
a bidder’s maximum willingness to pay in a Rosca auction as a function of his observed profit r,
b0 ( r ) say. First consider a standard SIPV auction and a bidder whose valuation for the item
auctioned is υ. By definition, this bidder’s maximum willingness to pay for the item is found by
equating the utility from winning the item at a standing bid of b0, Uw(b0|υ) ≡ υ – b0, with the
utility from losing the auction at the standing bid b0, Ul(b0|υ) ≡ 0, which gives the well-known
result b0(υ) = υ. Applying the same reasoning to a Rosca auction gives 2mr-cb0 = b0 + EUl and
thus
r

(7)

1+ c

 1 − F (t ) 
b ( r ) = ( 2mr − EU ) /(1 + c ) = b ( r ) − 2m∫ 
1 − F ( r ) 
r
0

l

e

dt /(1 + c ) .

That is, in the bidding equilibrium defined in Proposition 1, a bidder observing r adds
r

1+ c

 1 − F (t ) 
2m∫ 
1 − F ( r ) 
r

dt /(1+c) to his maximum willingness to pay to determine his bid. In this sense,
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4

Rosca bidders ‘overbid’ (like bidders in a standard SIPV first-price auction underbid). In
accordance with the literature on standard auctions, we will refer to bidding b0(r) as ‘truthful
bidding’ throughout the rest of this paper.
The extent of overbidding is decreasing in c because high costs of outside finance make
winning at a price higher than b0 ( r ) more painful. Another implication of overbidding is that a
bidder may win the auction at a price at which he would ex post prefer not to have won, which
can be interpreted as a winner’s curse from overbidding. This happens whenever
b e ( r1:2 ) > b0 ( r2:2 ) , which is always the case when r2:2 is sufficiently close to r1:2. This feature of
the model is in line with casual evidence from the field study, where organizers reported more
than once that, after the end of an auction, the winner wanted to renegotiate the auction outcome
saying he had not meant to bid so high and actually had no use for the money in that period.
Notice that, in the light of ( 6 ), overbidding as implied by the Nash Equilibrium increases
the expected winning bid and thus the strategic cost of bidding, which reduces participants’ ex
ante expected payoff from the Rosca.

2.4 Bidding Equilibrium with Altruism
In the environment in which our sample Roscas operate, there are good reasons to expect
departures from the just derived private information, one-shot bidding equilibrium. As described
in Section 1, in these Roscas, information may be – at least in part – public, bidders interact
repeatedly as documented by the number of Rosca cycles a given group has completed before the
Rosca that is in the dataset, organizers have a concern that bidding in their groups is not
excessive, and individual behavior in Rosca auctions likely affects a participant’s reputation

4

Outside the Rosca context, second-price auctions where the winning bid is distributed among
the losers of the auction have first been investigated by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994). He does
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outside the Rosca within the village. Such factors may mitigate the strategic costs of bidding and
thus increase the expected utility from Rosca participation. A natural way to incorporate such
considerations is to add a notion of altruism to the bidding model of Section 2.2.
To this end, we modify equation ( 2 ) to
(8)
where

(

)

U A ( ρ | r ) ≡ U w ( ρ | r ) + µ E[U! l ( ρ )] P w ( ρ ) + U l ( ρ ) + µ E[U! w ( ρ )] P l ( ρ ) /(1 + µ ) ,
E[U! l ( ρ )] = E[b( R ) | R < ρ ] + EU l

and

E[U! w ( ρ )] = 2mE[ R | R > ρ ] − cb( ρ )

is the

expected utility of the other bidder in case he loses or wins the auction, respectively. In the
sequel, we will refer to both positive and negative values of µ as ‘the altruistic case’, although the
latter in fact implies a higher utility when the other bidder is made worse off.
Now the first order condition can be written as
(9)

(1 − φ ) b′( r ) (1 − F ( r ) ) =

where φ = ( c − 1)

µ
1− µ

f ( r ) ( (1 + c )b( r ) + EU l − 2mr ) ,

. Even without deriving the solution to this differential equation, it can be

seen from ( 9 ) how altruism affects bidding. Obviously, for µ = 0, that is in the absence of
altruism, ( 9 ) is equivalent to ( 4 ), the first order condition derived in Subsection 2.2. More
interestingly, for φ equal to unity, that is for µ = 1/c, ( 9 ) degenerates to an algebraic equation
with solution b( r ) = ( 2mr − EU l ) /(1 + c ) , which is equivalent to the bidder’s maximum

willingness to pay for the pot, b0(r). Thus, for µ reciprocal to the cost of outside funds, truthful
bidding is the Nash Equilibrium. The reason is that, in this case, the marginal gain from
overbidding through a higher side payment when losing the auction, b′( r ) , is just equal to the

not address the issue of overbidding, however.
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marginal disutility caused by the marginal cost which the other, winning, bidder has to incur,

µc b′( r ) .
The solution to ( 9 ) is
1+ c


r
1−φ


1
F
(
t
)
−
l


b ( r ) ≡ 2mr − EU + 2m∫ 
dt /(1 + c ) .


1 − F ( r ) 
r


A

( 10 )

Defining βφ ≡ (θ, λ, c, δ, m, φ) and Bφ(b(⋅)) ≡ {βφ: b(r) < 2m(r-1)/(c-1) for all r > λ}, this bidding
equilibrium is summarized in

Proposition 2
For parameters β ∈ B(bA(⋅)) and φ ≥ 0,
(i)

a Rosca with altruistic bidders and second-price auctions has a symmetric bidding
equilibrium in which each bidder determines his bid according to the function bA(⋅).

(ii)

bids are strictly decreasing in the extent of altruism, ∂b A ( r ) / ∂φ < 0 for all r < r .

The way interim utility in ( 8 ) is normalized, ex ante expected utility in the presence of
altruism is completely analogous to the non-altruistic case (eq. ( 6 )) with only bA substituted for
be. We thus have

Proposition 3
For c > 1 and φ ≥ 0, ex ante expected utility from Rosca participation is strictly increasing in the
extent of altruism, ∂EU (b A ) / ∂φ > 0.
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3 STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF ROSCA AUCTIONS
In this section, we first derive a structural econometric model from the theoretical benchmark
model that was developed in Section 2.4. Although the literature has recently made considerable
progress in the field of nonparametric identification of auction models, structural estimation
seems inevitable in the present case because, in our dataset, not any two observations are
identically distributed, flawing any attempt to conduct reduced form inference. Subsection 3.2
discusses some issues of econometric methodology relevant for the structural estimation of Rosca
auctions while the third subsection presents the results. The whole section is organized such that
readers who are less concerned with the econometric details may skip Subsection 3.2.

3.1 Estimation Strategy
The goal of the empirical exercise is to identify which factors influence the welfare participants
derive from participating in a Rosca. As outlined above, bidding involves a social cost from an ex
ante perspective whenever c, the cost of funds from outside the Rosca, is bigger then unity. While
a framework that defines a unique bidding equilibrium for each Rosca auction, such as the private
information, non-altruistic model of Section 2.2, does not have room for identifying such factors,
the altruistic model of Section 2.4 with a continuum of equilibria, which can be unambiguously
welfare-ranked, does.
For the estimation, we first need to specify a distribution function F. For the exponential
distribution with shift parameter λ and scale parameter θ, F(r) = 1-Exp[-(r-λ)/θ] with r > λ, the
equilibrium bid function bA given in ( 10 ) is linear in r, in particular
( 11 )

b A (r) ≡

1
2mθ
2mr − EU l ) + (1 − φ )
.
(
1+ c
(1 + c )2
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Notice that, as in the general case, bA = be when φ = 0 and bA = b0 when φ = 1. In words, φ equal
to zero represents the non-altruistic Nash Equilibrium, φ equal to one truthful bidding, and, as
stated in Proposition 3, the higher φ, the higher the welfare from Rosca participation.
The estimation has to deal with auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Consider a
Rosca with n participants and the auction in the t’th round with νt + 1 bidders, say. One could
think of a variety of ways how the payoffs to the other bidders in such an auction enter a given
bidder’s utility. We consider the case where the average of the payoffs to the other bidders
weighted by a factor µt, say, enters a bidder’s utility. Then
( 12 )

U tA,i ( ρ | r ) ≡ U t ,i ( ρ | r ) +

µt
νt

∑ E[U!
j ≠i

t, j

( ρ )]/(1 + µt ) .

We choose to normalize µt such that observed bidding behavior satisfies two conditions: (i) in the
absence of altruism, that is for φ = 0, bidders bid according to the non-altruistic Nash
Equilibrium; (ii) for φ = 1, bidders bid truthfully. This defines µt = νtφ / (νt(c-1)+φ) and we obtain
( 13 )

btA ( rt ) ≡

νt

1 + cν t

− z )θ
.
( nmr − EU ) + (1 − φ ) ν ((1nm
+ν c )
t

l
t

t

2

t

In all of the sample Roscas, there is no auction in the second round, where the organizer
receives the pot without a discount. In turn, he is not a bidder in any of the n-2 auctions that occur
during the live of the Rosca. Further, in 9 of the 23 Roscas in the sample the organizer receives a
fixed commission only in the last round and, in each auction, shares the winning bid equally with
the auction’s losers. We shall refer to this form of commission as ‘variable commission’.
Consequently, in the Roscas where the organizer keeps a fixed commission

( 14 )

n − t, t > 2
,
 n − 2, t = 1

νt = 
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while with a variable commission
( 15 )

 n − t + 1, t ≥ 3
.
 n − 1, t = 1

νt = 

The expected utility of a losing bidder from remaining active in the following auctions, EU tl , is
obtained through the following recursion:

δ (nm − z)(λ +θ ), t = n




K −1   btA (RK −1:K ) 
 1
A
l
+ EUtl   , t = 3,4,..., n −1
EUt−1 = δ  ( (nm − z)E[RK:K ] − cE[bt ( RK −1:K )]) +
E


ν
K  


 K


δ EUtl , t = 2,



where, as above, Rj:l denotes the j’th lowest order statistic in a sample of l iid draws from F and K
the number of bidders in round t,

R| n − 1, t = 1
.
K≡S
|Tn − t + 1, t = 3, 4,..., n − 1
For the estimation, we will assume that all individuals have identical preferences, namely
the same discount factor δ, that all individuals are confronted with the same cost for external
funds c and the same lower bound of the revenue distribution λ, and that, in a given Rosca,
bidders have the same extent of altruism and bid symmetrically. We will abstract from any
problem that potential simultaneous participation in several Roscas and other forms of
unobserved heterogeneity among the participants may cause. Such heterogeneity could be due to
permanent individual characteristics such as different access to credit as well as considerations of
Rosca group formation where, for example, an individual without a daughter who is due to marry
soon would choose to join a group without any fathers of such daughters. These hypotheses,
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however, cannot be tested with our dataset, which does not contain information on bidders’
identities.
In contrast, the objective of the econometric exercise is to detect differences in bidding
across auctions in the dataset with a model of symmetric bidding as the benchmark. In this
connection, n, m, z, K and ν can be viewed as exogenous control variables, while δ, c and λ are
nuisance parameters. The key parameters in our analysis are θ and φ. Making these two
parameters functions of Rosca- and auction-specific characteristics will allow us to identify the
causes of differences in bidding across auctions. In particular recall that, for each Rosca in our
dataset, we have information on the history of each Rosca group and the experience of the
organizer. For each auction, moreover, we know the season, fall or winter, in which the auction
took place, the purpose the winner used the funds from the pot for, and whether the information
on the said purpose was private or public before the auction. To incorporate such effects into our
hypothesized bidding function, we need to distinguish between permanent and transitory effects:
we will call those characteristics permanent which affect the bidding function in each auction of a
Rosca and which participants include into their expectations about future auctions in that Rosca.
On the other hand, effects which affect only the bidding in one auction and which participants do
not include into their expectations about future auctions in the Rosca will be called transitory.
Formally we write the bidding function and the expected utility of an auction’s loser as
functions of possibly different sets of model-parameters so that ( 11 ) becomes

btA ( rt ;δ , c, λ ,θ1 ,φ1 ,θ2 ,φ2 ) ≡

ν

l
 ( nm − z )r − EU
" t  + (1 − φ ) ν ( nm − z )θ1 ,

t
1
1 + cν 
(1 +ν c )2


( 16 )
l

" t ≡ EUl (δ , c, λ,θ ,φ ) .
where EU
t
2 2
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Permanent characteristics are reflected by θ1, φ1, θ2 and φ2, while transitory characteristics only
affect one auction and are thus reflected by θ1 and φ1 only.
Recall that, while θ is a parameter determined by nature, φ reflects the degree of altruism
and captures deviations from the non-altruistic, private information Nash equilibrium. It thus
characterizes bidders’ strategic behavior. For the econometric model, we will therefore make θ a
function of those effects that are exogenous to the bidders. These effects can be divided into two
subgroups, namely (i) those that we will call strictly exogenous, such as seasonal fluctuations
peculiar to the agricultural cycle in E with its two harvests per year, and (ii) those that we will
call exogenous heterogeneity. This latter subgroup comprises characteristics that vary between
the Roscas in our sample. As to (i), it has been mentioned in Section 1.1 that, for farmers in E, the
autumn harvest yields about 50% more profit than the one in winter. Given a certain degree of
impatience, the net present value in utility terms from the future revenues of a field plot should
thus be higher after the winter than after the autumn harvest. Also, after an exceptionally bad
harvest as it occurred in the fall of 1997, farmers cannot finance the inputs for the following
growing season from the failed harvest’s revenues. Given the marginal product of seedlings and
fertilizers, however, one would expect a higher average return on Rosca funds after such a
harvest if they are the only way to finance these inputs. As to (ii), we will use information on the
experience of the organizer to control for exogenous heterogeneity between different Roscas. We
therefore allow for the possibility that experienced organizers may select participants with
different average revenues than less experienced ones. We will also use the contribution m as a
proxy for the wealth of each Rosca’s members, the idea being that a farmer’s wealth may be
correlated with the rate of return he can expect of an investment, e.g. because of higher
managerial skills. Formally, we define
( 17 ) θ1 ≡ θ0 + θm (m/1000-1) + θorg OE + θseas + θ972,
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( 18 ) θ2 ≡ θ0 + θm (m/1000-1) + θorg OE + θseas,
where OE is the number of Roscas an organizer claims to have completed before the one in the
sample, θseas equals zero when the observation stems from an auction after an autumn harvest,
and θ972 is a dummy on θ1 for the failed harvest in the autumn of 1997.
Turning to the altruism parameter, we make φ a function of several permanent and
transitory characteristics: of the permanent characteristics, we include the contribution and the
organizer’s experience to see whether the extent of overbidding is correlated with any of these
variables. We also include the number of Roscas that the organizer has had with the group in the
sample before, RB, to see whether there is anything like a learning curve from repeated
interaction between the same participants. To allow for a more flexible shape of such a curve, we
also include RB2. To see whether a different commission regime, namely a share of the winning
bid instead of a fixed commission for the organizer, affects bidders’ behavior further than implied
by the difference between ( 14 ) and ( 15 ), we include the dummy φvarcomm for those nine Roscas
that operate with a variable instead of a fixed commission regime. Transitory characteristics
affecting φ are given by the information structure before each auction. In particular, we include a
dummy for those auctions where the purpose of the auction’s winner was known to the other
bidders before the auction. The crucial point concerning all the variables that may affect φ is that,
due to Proposition 3, a higher value of φ ceteris paribus increases the welfare of participating in a
Rosca. Formally, we define
( 19 ) φ1 ≡ φ0+ φm(m/1000-1) + φorgOE + φRb RB + φRbsq RB2 + φvarcomm+ φpubl,marr+ φpubl,nomarr,
( 20 ) φ2 ≡ φ0+ φm(m/1000-1) + φorgOE + φRb RB + φRbsq RB2 + φvarcomm.
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We have divided the public information cases in two subcategories, marriage (22 occurrences)
and other than marriage purposes (14 occurrences), to test whether the common village wisdom
holds that bidding is more moderate in the case of a publicly known ‘emergency’, which usually
takes the form of a marriage, but less so if the winner needs the funds for a productive purpose.
Thus, φpubl,marr is a dummy which is different from zero only when the winner’s purpose was
publicly known before the auction and he used the money for a marriage or puberty function,
while φpubl,nomarr is a dummy which is different from zero only when the winner’s purpose was
publicly known before the auction and he used the money for some other purpose.

3.2 Econometric Issues
Since this paper is the first attempt to analyze Rosca auctions econometrically, we need to discuss
some methodological issues concerning the estimation of standard auctions and relate them to the
problems which the estimation of OA-Rosca auctions as modeled in this paper poses. In the
existing literature on the parametric estimation of standard auctions, it is invariably assumed that
each bidder's type υ is drawn from a hypothesized parametric distribution, H say. The major
concern is whether the auction protocol is such that bidders tell the truth or not, since, if bidders
tell the truth, the parameters characterising H can be estimated without further complication. If,
like in standard first-price sealed bid or Dutch auctions, the bidding equilibrium does not involve
truth-telling, however, observed winning bids in general depend on covariates and additional
parameters, which enter into a bidder's hypothesized bidding function (see Hendricks and
Paarsch, 1995). Since truth-telling is not an equilibrium of OA-Rosca auctions, the present
estimation faces the same econometric problem as the estimation of standard first-price sealed bid
and Dutch auctions.
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Two parametric methods for the structural estimation of standard first-price sealed bid and
Dutch auctions have been in use in the literature so far. First, generalized non-linear least squares,
advocated by Laffont et al. (1995), and, second, the method of maximum likelihood, whose nonstandard asymptotic properties have been derived by Donald and Paarsch (1996) and generalized
by Hong (1999). We adopt the method of maximum likelihood (ML) because, first, it is much
more efficient than the least squares approach, as Monte Carlo evidence by Paarsch (1994)
indicates, and, second, the likelihood function for the (rather complicated) present structural
econometric model behaves numerically better than the least squares objective function. ML
estimation of the present model, however, suffers from a problem similar to the one analyzed by
Donald and Paarsch (1996) and Hong (1999), namely, that parameters which determine the
boundary of the distribution have to be estimated. This violates an assumption used to prove the
standard asymptotic properties of maximum likelihood estimators (see Scholz, 1985). Donald and
Paarsch (1996) consider first-price sealed bid and Dutch auctions with a finite upper bound of the
support of the distribution from which the bidders’ values are drawn. The difficulty arises from
estimating this upper bound, α say, which, in the more interesting cases, is a function of
covariates and a vector of further parameters, β say. As a remedy, they suggest to maximize the
observed bids’ log-likelihood subject to a set of inequality restrictions, which ensure that the
estimator βˆ is chosen such that none of the observed bids exceeds α ( βˆ ) . The asymptotics of βˆ
are not standard and involve extreme value theory. A key assumption of their analysis is that,
evaluated at α, the density function corresponding to the values’ distribution is bigger than zero.
In the present case, each observed bid in the dataset, b jw say, j = 1,..., J, where J is the
total number of observations in the dataset, is a linear function of a random variable which is the
second highest order statistic from a sample of Kj exponential random variables, Kj ≥ 2. We write
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RK j −1:K j ∼ G K j −1:K j (⋅; λ ,θ 1 j ) , where θ1j is defined as in ( 17 ) and Gk :K (⋅; ζ , γ ) is the distribution
function of the k-th smallest order statistic from a sample of K random variables drawn from an
exponential distribution with shift parameter ζ and scale parameter γ. By virtue of ( 11 ), B jw is
distributed according to GK j −1:K j (⋅; η j , ω j ) , where

ηj =



ρ1 jθ1 j
 ( n j m j − z j )  λ +
1 + cv j 
1 + cν j


νj

 "l 
ν j (n j m j − z j )
θ1 j ,
t j  and ω j =
 − EU

1 + cν j



l

where ρ1j is defined as in ( 19 ) and EU t j is a function of θ2j and ρ2j, which in turn are defined as
in ( 18 ) and ( 20 ). Note that every variable which depends on the specific characteristics of the
Rosca auction from which B jw had been sampled has been indexed with j. Defining G ≡ G1:1 and
g as the density function corresponding to G, the density of B jw can be written as

d

f B w (b) ≡ K j ( K j − 1) G (b; η j , ω j )
j

( 21 )

R|
|
=S
|| K ( K
T
j

i d1 − G(b;η ,ω )ig(b;η ,ω )
K j −2

j

j

j

j

0, b < η j

j

− 1)ω j

−1

F1 − expF − b − η I I
GH GH ω JK JK

K j −2

F
GH

exp −2

j

j

b−η j

ωj

I,b ≥ η .
JK
j

To highlight the methodological issues involved, consider the non-regression case of a
sample of identically distributed winning bids and parameters η and ω that do not depend on
covariates and further parameters. The log-likelihood for this estimation problem is

−∞, b < η
R|
|
( 22 ) ! (η,ω) ≡ S
||J logbK(K −1)g − J log(ω) + ∑FG(K − 2)logFG1− expFGH− b ω−ηIJKIJ − 2 b ω−ηIJ, b
H
K
K
H
T
1:J

K

J

j

j

1:J

j =1
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≥ η.

Note that, for all K ≥ 2, ML estimation is nonregular because the domain of Bw depends on η.
For K = 2, ! K (η, ω ) is strictly increasing in η as long as η < b1:J, which means that
5

! K (η, ω ) does not have an interior maximum w.r.t. η. Consequently, the ML estimator of η in
this case is b1: J . If, moreover, η is a function of covariates and further parameters, ML estimation
poses the same econometric problem as the one considered by Donald and Paarsch (1996) and
Hong (1999) and involves extreme value theory. For K > 2, on the other hand, it is readily
verified that ! K (η, ω ) has an interior maximum.
To put the present estimation problem into the context of the existing literature on
nonregular ML estimation, we adopt Smith’s (1985) notation. He considers probability densities
of the form
f (b;η,φ ) = (b − η) K −2 h(b − η;φ ) , η ≤ b, K ≥ 2,

( 23 )

where η and φ, the latter a vector, are unknown parameters and the function h tends to the
constant (K-1)χ as bäη. We then obtain

Lemma 1: Let g K −1:K (b;η,ω ) denote the density function of the second highest order statistic
from a sample of K random variables drawn from an exponential distribution with shift
parameter η and scale parameter ω. Define hK (b - η; ω) ≡ g K −1:K (b;η,ω ) (b − η) 2− K and

χ K ≡ lim hK (b − η;ω ) /(K-1). Then, for all K ≥ 2, χ K = Kω 1− K .

B

b η

Proof: see the Appendix.

5

In fact, for K = 2, Bw has an exponential distribution with shift parameter η and scale parameter
ω/2.
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Lemma 1 establishes that the non-regression variety of the present estimation problem is a
special case of the nonregular class considered by Smith (1985), who shows that,
(i)

if K > 3, the likelihood function has an interior maximum and the nonregular ML
estimators η̂ and ω̂ have the same asymptotic properties as in regular cases, i.e. both η̂
and ω̂ converge at an order of O( J 0.5 ) to a bivariate normal distribution whose
covariance matrix may be estimated consistently with the inverse of the observed
information matrix. Moreover, Greene (1980) has generalized this result to the regression
case.

(ii)

if K = 3, the likelihood function has an interior maximum and the nonregular ML
estimators η̂ and ω̂ are consistent and asymptotically normal. While, for ω̂ , the order of
convergence is the usual O( J 0.5 ) , η̂ converges faster to the true value of η, namely at an

eb

order of O J log( J )

g j . Although the expected information matrix does not exist, the
0.5

inverse of the observed information matrix is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic
covariance matrix of ηˆ and ω̂ .
(iii)

if K = 2, the likelihood function does not have an interior maximum w.r.t. η. Instead,

η̂ = b1:J, whose asymptotic distribution can be derived using results from extreme value
theory. For the regression case, Hong (1999) shows that the asymptotic distribution of
ML estimators is not normal and quite complicated.
Our dataset includes observations with K ranging between 2 and 16. The bulk of
observations, however, belongs to the first and second of the three just-mentioned categories (131
and 10 of 149, respectively). Since, for a sample where all Kj ≥ 3, the likelihood function always
has an interior maximum, we choose to drop those eight observations where Kj = 2 to ensure that
the likelihood function has an interior maximum and that standard methods of asymptotic
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inference can be applied. Although, for the regression case, results on the asymptotic distribution
of the ML estimators are not available when K = 3, we choose to also use the 10 observations in
the second category for the estimation because, first, the applicability of standard methods of
inference has been demonstrated by Smith (1985) for the non-regression case and, second, Monte
Carlo experiments which I conducted with artificial data indicate that this result carries over to
the regression case, at least for the present model.

3.3 Results
As explained in the previous subsection, for the estimation, we use all 141 observations in the
dataset that stem from auctions with more than two bidders. Table 2 shows the distribution of
these winning bids with respect to the date of the auction and the contribution. The seemingly
irregular pattern of recorded winning bids over time is due to the fact that, in the second round of
each Rosca, there is no auction and thus no winning bid recorded.
The estimation results are set out in Table 3. Our structural model performs well in that
convergence of the numerical likelihood maximization occurs at reasonable values of the
6

parameters without further calibration of the model. Before discussing the results, we briefly
turn to some diagnostics. First, and most importantly, residuals are not trending with respect to
Rosca rounds, which means that the sequential structure of our model is capable of explaining the
intertemporal pattern of observed bids successfully.
Another issue that needs to be addressed at this point is the assumption we have made in
setting up the theoretical model, namely that an auction’s winner always prefers to invest the

6

In contrast, in a static model with log-normally distributed private values, Laffont et al. (1995)
encounter convergence problems in their attempt to structurally estimate Dutch auctions for
eggplants among wholesalers in Marmande, France, which they only manage to overcome by
fixing the value of the shape parameter of the log-normal distribution at some calibrated value,
which they obtain by rules of thumb methods.
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funds he obtains from the Rosca over consuming them (see eq. ( 1 )). It is easily shown that,
conditional on the revenue an auction’s winner observes, RK j :K j , this is the case whenever the
~
winning bid realized in that auction does not exceed a certain threshold, b j ( RK j :K j ) say, where
~
~
the subscript j in b j (⋅) indicates that, for each observation in the dataset, b depends on the
~
realized values of the covariates. Note that b j ( RK j :K j ) may be smaller than btAj ( RK j :K j ) for all
RK j :K j > λ, in which case our assumption on the use of Rosca funds would be supported by

observation j without qualifications. With the point estimates reported in Table 3, the total
~
probability that a winner wins the pot at a price higher than b ( RK j :K j ) , that is

(

)

P btAj ( RK j −1:K j ) > b!j ( RK j :K j ) , is zero for each observation in the dataset. Thus our assumption on

the use of Rosca funds is consistent with the data.
Turning to the results, the estimates of both δ and c have a reasonable order of magnitude.
If we take into account a rate of inflation of 4.6% from harvest to harvest (see Section 2.1), which
enters δ in addition to pure individual impatience, then, after any harvest, individuals value the
revenues in real terms from the following harvest about 5% less. To provide some intuition for
the estimated value of c, suppose the winner of a pot had to finance the amount of the winning
bid by a loan, which is repaid two harvests later and bears an interest rate of i per harvest. Since c
measures the present value of all contemporaneous and future costs in utility terms, we obtain
c = 1 + i(δ + δ 2). Using this equation, we find a value of i of about 0.30. This is well in
accordance with prevailing moneylender interest rates in E, which range between 3 and 5% per
month. The point estimate of λ supports the working hypothesis made in Section 2.1 that the
payoff for each Rupee invested be bigger than one, although, taking into account the estimated
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standard error, the hypothesis that λ is equal to or smaller than unity fails to be rejected at
common significance levels.
Turning to the parameters of interest, note that λ-1+θ0 measures the average profitability
of an investment project after the autumn harvest for bidders in a Rosca with a contribution of Rs.
1000. The point estimates of λ, θ0 and c imply that the utility cost of external funds are about
25% higher than the average profit of an investment project. The point estimates of the two
parameters that measure strictly exogenous effects on θ, θseas and θ972, both have the expected
positive sign but are not significant at conventional levels. At the 5% level, the only significant
source of exogenous heterogeneity is the amount of the contribution, which, as has been argued,
serves as a proxy for participants’ wealth. Taking together the point estimates of λ, θ0 and θm, we
find that participants in Roscas with a contribution of Rs. 5000 have access to investment projects
whose average rate of return is about 24% higher than in Roscas with a contribution of Rs. 1000.
We now discuss the results pertaining to φ, which, as has been argued, matters for the
welfare from Rosca participation. At first glance, the point estimate of φ0 seems to suggest that,
in the sample, there is in fact negative altruism, the T-statistic for the hypothesis φ0 = 0 being
-2.79. Notice, however, that φ0 is the value of φ for private-information auctions in Roscas where
the organizer is completely inexperienced, receives a fixed instead of a variable commission, and
the group has not completed any Rosca cycle before. Taking into account the average experience
of Rosca organizers in the sample and the lower degree of overbidding in groups where the
organizer earns a variable commission, we arrive at a value of φ of -0.42 for an auction with
private information, which is different from zero by less than one standard deviation.
Turning to the Rosca-specific characteristics affecting φ in more detail, we included a
dummy for those 9 groups that compensate the organizer through a share in the winning bid

32

rather than a fixed commission. Note that, within the benchmark model, the presence of another
member who shares the winning bid in each auction implies less overbidding than when there is a
fixed commission. The point estimate of φvarcomm points into the direction that this effect might be
even stronger than implied by the theory.
The amount of the contribution, which serves as a proxy for participants’ wealth, does not
appear to affect the extent of altruism. On the other hand, we find a significant positive
relationship between the experience of a Rosca organizer and the extent of altruism. Thus
experienced organizers generate a higher welfare for their participants than newcomers. Not
surprisingly, all organizers whom I interviewed pointed out that high bidding is bad for an
organizer’s reputation (see also observation 9 in Section 1.3). It was also pointed out that a high
winning bid decreases a winner’s motivation to follow up his obligations to pay future Rosca
contributions and thus potentially causes the organizer trouble. Experienced organizers explained
that they are in general very careful in the selection of new participants and that, when a Rosca
ends, they would not invite those participants to new Roscas who regularly drive up the bid more
than usual. On the other hand, some newcomer organizers in the village had the reputation of
admitting more or less everybody to their Roscas. This selection process may also be the reason
for the empirical observation that many individuals join a Rosca with a less experienced
organizer although the welfare implications are likely to be known to them.
An interesting finding is the inverted U-shape of the relationship between the number of
completed Roscas a group had run through before and the extent of overbidding. The estimates of

φRb and φRbsq imply that, for a group which had three Roscas before, φ is about 4.76 bigger than
for a group which had run through exactly one Rosca cycle before. Following the estimates,
altruism is less strong in groups which had completed one Rosca cycle previously than in newly
formed groups. After two Rosca cycles have been completed, however, the extent of altruism
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7

increases sharply with every further cycle completed. This finding suggests that long lasting
repeated relationships facilitate social gains, however, with the adjustment to such a favorable
outcome taking a non-monotonic path.
The dummy for auction outcomes where the winner needs money for a publicly known
marriage or puberty function has the expected positive sign and is significant at conventional
levels. Averaging over commission regimes and organizer’s experience, the point estimates imply
a value of φ of about 0.5 for such auctions, and thus, compared to the private information
equilibrium, a degree of altruism which corresponds to bids even below the maximum
willingness to pay. Lower winning bids in such cases indicate that Rosca participants show a cooperative behavior, which is likely based on reciprocity and social enforcement. It is well known
that when information on an individual’s situation is publicly observable, self-enforcing
reciprocal relationships can be implemented in a straightforward fashion (see Coate and
Ravallion, 1993, for a theoretical analysis of bilateral consumption insurance). Organizers
pointed out that it is considered improper behavior to raise the bid as usual when some other
8

bidder has an ‘emergency’.

On the other hand, the significant positive dummy for the 16 observations with a publicly
known purpose other than a marriage or puberty function at first sight contradicts the common
wisdom in the village that a productive purpose should be always kept secret since otherwise
other bidders would take advantage of one’s desire to obtain the pot. It is, therefore, worthwhile
to look at these observations in more detail. Only in two cases was the pot used for the purchase
of a field, which is the most common use in the private information category. Other purposes

7

If only a linear term is included, an insignificant estimate of 0.1 obtains.
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mentioned are the purchase of a motor bike, starting a non-agricultural business, buying jewels
and domestic use (one occurrence each). The bulk of winners in this non-marriage-publicinformation category, in contrast, needed money to repair their houses (6 occurrences) or settle
debt (3 occurrences). It is likely that the need to repair one’s house (which, in E, is mostly not a
cosmetic, but a vital operation) and, in certain instances, also to repay debt is evident to other
bidders and that therefore the auction outcomes in these cases reflect the same element of co9

operative behavior based on reciprocity as those in the marriage-public-information category.

4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, the symmetric, independent private value bidder framework for the analysis of
auctions has been applied to develop a novel stochastic model which reflects the basic features of
bidding Roscas in a typical agricultural village of south India. We find that the non-altruistic
equilibrium of this model involves a notion of overbidding because losing bidders benefit from a
high price through a price-proportional side payment. Moreover, based on the empirical evidence
that funds from the Rosca are used to overcome indivisibilities and that outside credit is costly for
Rosca members, bidding creates a social cost of strategic behavior. Since village Roscas operate
in an environment where repeated interaction between bidders occurs both within and outside the
Rosca and where the information structure may change from auction to auction, we introduce
altruism, whereby each bidder’s utility is not only a function of the payoffs that occur to himself

8

On the other hand, Bouman (1979) reports such 'crafty' bidding practices when information on a
bidder's need of funds is public.
9
Inclusion of a dummy for the purposes renovating house and settling debt in private information
auctions gives no significant result indicating that, in general, the revenue of the said purposes
in utility terms appears to be similar to the more frequently-mentioned purposes under private
information such as buying a field plot or livestock.
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but also of the payoffs to all other bidders. We find that the extent of altruism positively affects
the welfare derived from joining a Rosca.
We estimate a structural econometric model and find evidence that, on average, groups of
experienced Rosca organizers act more altruistically than groups of newcomer-organizers,
indicating that effective leadership positively affects the welfare of Rosca members. Moreover, in
groups which have completed more than one Rosca cycle before, altruism is stronger than in
Rosca groups with only a short history, which points to social gains from enduring relationships
in an environment of private information.
Our data show that, in most of the auctions, information is private, especially when the
funds from the Rosca are used for productive investment. On the other hand, when a bidder has a
pecuniary emergency like the marriage of a daughter and this information is public within the
village, auction outcomes display a stronger altruistic element than when information is private,
which provides evidence for reciprocal risk sharing in an environment of public information.
This study shows that actual bidding Roscas succeed in accommodating several different
financial needs that involve an amount of money which an individual could most likely not obtain
from other sources such as the formal financial sector. It, moreover, illustrates how bidding
Roscas allocate funds in an environment in which both private and public information are present
and how repeated interaction among economic actors helps to reduce strategic costs. However,
bidding Roscas as studied in this paper involve two major drawbacks: first, the auction protocol
of oral ascending bids generates an incentive for bidders to overbid relative to their valuation,
which in turn decreases the welfare from Rosca participation. Second, Roscas provide financial
intermediation on a very small scale, in our dataset among ten to seventeen individuals at a time,
which results in highly volatile auction outcomes. Our results suggest, however, that the auction
protocol is crucial for the flexibility of a Rosca to respond to changing informational
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environments. Oral ascending bids enable participants to make exceptions from competitive
bidding when a bidder has to meet an unforeseen expenditure and this information is public. The
limited size of the group allows experienced organizers to limit the extent of bidding and
facilitates gains from an enduring relationship when the same participants join the same Rosca
group repeatedly.
In previous theoretical research on bidding Roscas among ex-ante identical individuals, it
was assumed that participants observe all relevant signals before the beginning of a Rosca, that
information is either completely private (Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen, 1999) or completely public
(Besley et al. 1993, 1994), and that a Rosca is a one-shot game. Not surprisingly, these authors
have found that the strategic costs which the auction allocation mechanism entails make a lottery
allocation of funds superior and that, due to a more flexible payoff pattern, a credit market creates
a higher welfare than a bidding Rosca. Our analysis shows that that these authors have missed the
central features of a typical environment in which bidding Roscas operate, namely that
participants receive new signals before each auction, that the information structure may change
from auction to auction, and that repeated interaction plays an important role. While this paper
does not compare Roscas with other financial institutions, it should serve as a point of departure
for a more realistic comparison of the performance of different rural financial institutions and
help to design optimal institutions under more realistic assumptions.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1:
First note that g K −1:K (⋅; η, ω ) is equal to f B w (⋅) as given in ( 21 ) with the subscript j dropped
j

throughout. It is easily verified that the derivative of g K −1:K (⋅; η, ω ) has the following property:
( 24 )

∂g K −1:K (b;η,ω )
= ω −1 Kg K − 2:K −1 (b;η,ω ) − 2 g K −1:K (b;η,ω ) , K ≥ 3.
∂b

b

g

Equation ( 24 ) may be used to prove the following representation of the L-th derivative of
g K −1:K (⋅; η, ω ) by induction.

( 25 )

FG IJ
HK

L
L
∂ L g K −1:K (b;η,ω )
K!
−L
ω
=
g K − l −1:K − l (b;η,ω ) , L ≤ K – 2.
(−2) L−l
∑
L
l ( K − l )!
∂b
l =0

Notice that g K −1:K (η; η, ω ) = 2/ω if K = 2 and g K −1:K (η; η, ω ) = 0 if K > 2. Together with ( 25 ),
∂ L g K −1:K (b;η,ω )
∂ L g K −1:K (b;η,ω )
this implies that
= 0 , if L < K – 2, and
= K !ω 1− K , if
L
L
∂b
∂b
|b =η
|b =η

L = K – 2.

We

can

thus

apply

L’Hôpital’s

rule

(K – 2)

times

to

obtain

g K −1:K (b;η,ω ) K !ω 1− K
lim hK (b − η;ω ) = lim
=
. Recalling the definition of χ K , the result stated
bBη
bBη
(b − η) K − 2
( K − 2) !

in Lemma 1 follows immediately.
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Table 1. The sample: some descriptive statistics.
Minimum

Maximum

Mean Std. Dev.

Rosca-specific characteristics
Contribution (Rupees)

700

5000 2461.75

1544.37

Number of participants in the Rosca

10

17

11.80

2.43

Number of Roscas the group has run before
the one from which the observation stems

0

3

0.90

1.03

Number of Roscas completed by the
organizer before starting the one from which
the observation stems

0

8

2.07

2.26

Round of the Rosca in which the auction
took place

1

16

5.57

3.35

Private (= 0) vs. public (= 1) information
before the auction

0

1

0.27

0.44

Season: Auction occurred after a winter (=1)
or autumn (=2) harvest

1

2

1.52

0.50

Auction-specific characteristics
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Table 2. Frequency table of recorded auction outcomes used for the estimation.
date*→
m ↓ ‚
19922‚
19931‚
19932‚
19941‚
19942‚
19951‚
19952‚
19961‚
19962‚
19971‚
19972‚
19981‚
19982‚
19991‚
19992‚
20001‚
20002‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
700 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
1 ‚
0 ‚
1 ‚
1 ‚
1 ‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
1000 ‚
1 ‚
1 ‚
1 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
5 ‚
4 ‚
5 ‚
5 ‚
4 ‚
2 ‚
1 ‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
2000 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
1 ‚
0 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
5 ‚
3 ‚
5 ‚
7 ‚
5 ‚
5 ‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
3000 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
1 ‚
0 ‚
1 ‚
2 ‚
1 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
4 ‚
4 ‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
5000 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
0 ‚
2 ‚
0 ‚
2 ‚
2 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
4 ‚
3 ‚
3 ‚
5 ‚
2 ‚
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ
Total
1
1
1
2
2
4
3
6
7
9
12
13
16
16
18
17
13

* date=XXXXY, where XXXX = year, Y = 1 for winter harvest, Y = 2 for autumn harvest (e.g. 19952: autumn harvest of 1995)
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Total
4
46
37
22
32
141

Table 3. Estimation results.
Parameter

Estimate

STD #

T

δ

Individual discount factor

0.904

0.035

26.16*

c

Disutility per Rupee borrowed

1.519

0.575

2.64*

λ

Lower bound of the profitability distribution

1.264

0.576

2.20*

θ0

Scale of the profitability distribution: intercept

0.163

0.057

2.85*

φ0

Altruism parameter: intercept

-2.521

0.904

-2.79*

Rosca-specific characteristics

θm

Change in θ as a function of the Rosca contribution

0.026

0.013

1.97*

φm

Change in φ as a function of the Rosca contribution

-0.174

0.179

-0.98

θorg

Change in θ as a function of the organizer’s
experience

-0.009

0.005

-1.88

φorg

Change in φ as a function of the organizer’s
experience

0.799

0.220

3.64*

φRb

Change in φ as a linear function of the number of
Roscas the group had before

-3.743

1.122

-3.34*

φRbsq

Change in φ as a quadratic function of the number of
Roscas the group had before

1.530

0.458

3.34*

φvarcomm

Dummy on φ for Roscas where the organizer shares
the winning bid

1.174

0.664

1.77

Auction-specific characteristics

φpub,marr

Dummy on φ for public information, purpose =
marriage

1.893

0.760

2.49*

φpub,nomarr

Dummy on φ for public information, purpose other
than marriage

2.704

1.073

2.52*

θseas

Dummy on θ for winter auctions

0.028

0.016

1.70

θ972

Dummy on θ for the 1997 autumn auction

0.056

0.034

1.66

#

obtained from the empirical Hessian
* significant at the 5% level
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